India’s Silence on Khamenei Assassination Draws Criticism Amid Shifting Alliances
New Delhi – India’s muted response to the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and subsequent strikes within Iran has sparked criticism from opposition parties and raised questions about a potential realignment of foreign policy priorities. While External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar spoke with his Iranian counterpart following the initial conflict on February 28, New Delhi has refrained from issuing a strong condemnation of the U.S.-Israeli involvement, a departure from past statements on similar events.
The assassination of Khamenei, confirmed by Iranian state media on March 1, 2026, has been followed by escalating regional counterattacks. Joint U.S.-Israeli missile strikes have reportedly targeted civilian infrastructure, including a girls’ primary school in Minab, resulting in an estimated 150 deaths and 100 injuries, according to UN estimates. Hospitals in Tehran, including the Gandhi Hospital, have also sustained damage. The World Health Organization chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus has described the attacks as “deeply concerning.”
Opposition parties in India have contrasted this silence with the government’s historical stance against violations of sovereignty and unilateral actions. In 2020, following the U.S. assassination of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, India’s Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement expressing “alarm” and emphasizing the importance of peace and stability in the region. Then-Foreign Minister Javad Zarif openly criticized the U.S. during a visit to Delhi shortly after. India also observed a day of mourning following the death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in 2024.
However, experts suggest several factors are influencing the current approach. Former Ambassador to Iran Rakesh Sood pointed to a complex geopolitical landscape, a circumscribed relationship with Iran in recent decades, and past criticisms of India by Khamenei regarding issues in Kashmir and the treatment of minorities.
India’s relationship with Israel has demonstrably strengthened in recent years, particularly since Prime Minister Modi’s historic visit to Israel in 2017 and the subsequent visit by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to India in 2018. Modi’s recent address to the Knesset, where he affirmed India’s “full conviction” in standing with Israel, signals a potential shift away from traditional regional balance. Netanyahu reportedly thanked Modi for his support following Khamenei’s death, calling the Supreme Leader a “tyrant.”
Economic factors also appear to be at play. Trade between India and Iran has significantly declined from approximately $17 billion in 2018 to $1.68 billion in 2025, largely due to U.S. sanctions. The future of the Chabahar port project, a key element of India-Iran cooperation, is also uncertain as a U.S. sanctions waiver is set to expire in April. Reports indicate India has already “front-loaded” its financial commitment to the port and reduced its personnel presence. Israeli missiles have reportedly targeted infrastructure at the Chabahar port.
Furthermore, India’s growing ties with Gulf nations, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and the safety of the approximately 10 million Indians residing in those countries, are likely considerations. The Modi government recently announced a defense partnership with the UAE.
The situation remains fluid, with the possibility of continued U.S. operations against Iran and potential disruptions to trade, connectivity, and energy supplies. India is scheduled to host the BRICS summit this year, and the outcome of the conflict will undoubtedly have a lasting impact on the grouping, which now includes both Iran and the UAE. New Delhi faces difficult choices as it navigates these competing interests and seeks to protect its strategic and economic priorities.
