China Walks a Tightrope as Iran War Intensifies, Prioritizing Economic Interests
By [Your Name], International Editor, nouvelles-du-monde.com
BEIJING – As the conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran escalates, China finds itself in a delicate position, publicly expressing concern while quietly prioritizing its own economic and strategic interests. While Beijing has frequently voiced outrage over the U.S. and Israeli actions against Iran, its response to retaliatory strikes by Tehran against Arab neighbors has been markedly more subdued.
Since the start of the war on February 28, 2026, China has called for de-escalation and respect for the territorial integrity of Gulf nations, but notably without specifying who should respect that integrity. This cautious approach reflects a complex web of relationships, where China has cultivated deeper ties with Iran’s regional adversaries over the past two decades, despite Iran being its most important trade partner.
“China’s public statements are an easy approach that will frustrate both Iran and Arab states,” analysts say, adding that Beijing’s tepid response is calculated to avoid alienating either side.
Recent apologies from Iran to its Arab neighbors have been welcomed in Beijing, and may have even been encouraged by Chinese officials, including its special envoy. However, tensions remain high, as evidenced by a strongly worded condemnation from Saudi Arabia on March 9.
The situation highlights China’s pragmatic foreign policy, which prioritizes stability and economic gain over ideological alignment. Unlike traditional alliances, China doesn’t engage in formal partnerships, and has demonstrated a willingness to distance itself from allies when their interests diverge. This was previously seen with the overthrows of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.
China’s economic interests are central to its approach. Approximately 45 percent of its oil imports travel through the Strait of Hormuz, and rising oil prices would exacerbate China’s existing deflationary pressures. To mitigate this risk, China began building up its strategic oil reserves last year, reaching 104 days of coverage in early January and projecting 140-180 days by the end of 2026. Furthermore, Chinese oil demand dipped slightly in 2025, leaving hundreds of Iranian oil tankers waiting to offload.
While the conflict could disrupt oil flows, China is positioned to benefit. The diversion of U.S. military assets to the Middle East could lessen pressure on China’s borders, particularly regarding Taiwan. China also sees the conflict as a learning opportunity to observe U.S. naval operations.
Despite a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement signed in 2021, only $2 billion to $3 billion of the promised $400 billion in Chinese financial commitments to Iran has materialized. This underscores the limitations of the relationship, and Iran’s relatively low priority in China’s broader strategic calculations.
China will likely continue to sell arms and materials to Iran, while simultaneously bolstering its relationships with Iran’s rivals, particularly Russia, Brazil, Angola, and Canada, to diversify its oil supply. The U.S. recently granted India an exemption to import Russian oil, acknowledging the difficulty of finding alternatives, a situation China is well-positioned to exploit.
More than 3,000 Chinese citizens have been evacuated from Iran since the fighting began, a figure dwarfed by the 36,000 evacuated from Libya in 2011, reflecting the greater extent of China’s economic interests in the latter.